tuzi-image-gen

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/providers/google.ts contains a command injection vulnerability due to unsafe shell interpolation.
  • Evidence: In the postGoogleJsonViaCurl function, the code executes a curl command using execSync with variables proxyArgs and url embedded directly in the command string: curl -s ... ${proxyArgs} "${url}" ....
  • Vulnerability: The proxyArgs variable is constructed from proxy-related environment variables (e.g., HTTPS_PROXY), and the url is constructed from GOOGLE_BASE_URL. Neither variable is sanitized or escaped before being passed to the shell. If an attacker can influence these environment variables (for example, by tricking the agent into writing a malicious value to a .env file), they can execute arbitrary shell commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated images from various AI provider endpoints including OpenAI, Google, DashScope, and the author's own Tuzi API.
  • Details: The scripts in scripts/providers/ perform HTTP GET requests to retrieve image data from URLs returned by the generation APIs (e.g., api.tu-zi.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, api.openai.com, dashscope.aliyuncs.com). This is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of image generation.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:30 PM