tuzi-image-gen
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/providers/google.tscontains a command injection vulnerability due to unsafe shell interpolation. - Evidence: In the
postGoogleJsonViaCurlfunction, the code executes acurlcommand usingexecSyncwith variablesproxyArgsandurlembedded directly in the command string:curl -s ... ${proxyArgs} "${url}" .... - Vulnerability: The
proxyArgsvariable is constructed from proxy-related environment variables (e.g.,HTTPS_PROXY), and theurlis constructed fromGOOGLE_BASE_URL. Neither variable is sanitized or escaped before being passed to the shell. If an attacker can influence these environment variables (for example, by tricking the agent into writing a malicious value to a.envfile), they can execute arbitrary shell commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated images from various AI provider endpoints including OpenAI, Google, DashScope, and the author's own Tuzi API.
- Details: The scripts in
scripts/providers/perform HTTP GET requests to retrieve image data from URLs returned by the generation APIs (e.g.,api.tu-zi.com,generativelanguage.googleapis.com,api.openai.com,dashscope.aliyuncs.com). This is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of image generation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata