tuzi-update-claude-md
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting external, potentially untrusted data from user arguments and git history to generate documentation updates in
CLAUDE.mdanddocs/CODING_RULES.md. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
$ARGUMENTSparameter and the output ofgit diffandgit logcommands defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or boundary markers to isolate external content from the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (
CLAUDE.md,docs/CODING_RULES.md) and perform repository operations (git add,git commit). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data retrieved from external sources before it is incorporated into the documentation updates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Bash commands to perform environment checks, file system operations, and git repository interactions.
- Evidence: Execution of
test -fto check configuration files,wc -lfor line counting, andgitcommands (diff,log,add,commit) for repository state management.
Audit Metadata