bio-reproducer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data from scientific papers (PDF/HTML) and metadata from public genomic archives (SRA, ENA, GEO). This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Paper content extracted to
01_plan/paper_markdown/and metadata records stored in04_data/data_manifest.md. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses structured logging, it lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded directives when processing paper content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, execute shell commands through the
async_submit.shutility, and manage containerized environments. - Sanitization: The
async_submit.shscript utilizesprintf %qto escape input variables when generating temporary shell scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
async_submit.shutility to execute bioinformatics pipelines and tools as background processes. This mechanism is core to the skill's function for long-running analyses but grants the agent direct shell execution capabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches datasets, paper supplemental files, and software dependencies from external scientific repositories (e.g., Zenodo, Figshare, bioRxiv) and container registries. The instructions prioritize user approval for these operations.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
async_submit.shscript dynamically generates and executes shell scripts in the.task_status/directory at runtime to manage task state, backgrounding, and logging.
Audit Metadata