byted-mediakit-shared
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Processes external media via
--video-url,--sub-image-url, and subtitle data via--subtitlesor@filepointers as seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit instruction-ignoring delimiters or safety boundaries are defined for the content of the fetched media or subtitle files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
shellpermissions and executes commands viamediakit-clito perform file operations, network requests for media fetching, and complex media processing as documented inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The instructions provide specific shell escaping and JSON formatting guidelines for parameters, but do not specify sanitization for the content of the external files themselves.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading and installing a CLI tool at runtime.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the user to runnpx @volcengine/mediakit-cli install -yfor initial setup andmediakit-cli updatefor maintenance. These downloads originate from the verified vendor's own package registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on executing shell commands to function.
- Evidence: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdandreference/query_task.mdcenters on constructing and executingmediakit-clicommands with various parameters, including environment variable injection for authentication and runtime context.
Audit Metadata