volcengine-tls
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices for agent-cli interactions. It contains explicit instructions to never read, print, or persist sensitive access keys (AK/SK) or tokens in prompts or request artifacts (SKILL.md). It also leverages dry-run capabilities for contract validation before execution (best-practices.md).
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles log data which acts as a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, but the design and instructions mitigate this risk.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
volclog tool exec log.searchandvolclog workflow exec log.ingest(SKILL.md, routing.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate reading the full JSON envelope and using
--jmes-filterfor precise extraction, ensuring data is clearly separated from instructions (SKILL.md). - Capability inventory: All capabilities are limited to the
volclog/veCLI tool for log management and search; no dangerous tools likeeval,exec, or arbitrary network operations are present (SKILL.md, sops.md). - Sanitization: The skill uses structured JSON via the
--inputflag, which enforces strict schema validation through the CLI tool's contract (SKILL.md, best-practices.md).
Audit Metadata