volcengine-sale
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes logic to automatically provision required tools if they are not already available in the environment.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddescribes an automated installation process ("依赖 skill 自动加载") that triggers when a requested product's skill is missing. - Source URLs: The skill references official vendor repositories such as
https://github.com/volcengine/ark-cliandhttps://github.com/volcengine-tls/ve-tls-cliinreferences/product-rule.mdas sources forgit cloneoperations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell-based operations to execute billing actions and check instance status via the vendor's CLI tool.
- Evidence:
references/commonbuy.mdoutlines the execution ofve billing CommonBuyandve billing ListAvailableInstancesusing theBashtool. - Security Controls: The instructions mandate that the agent must present the command to the user and obtain explicit permission before execution ("未经用户确认不得执行").
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a router for user purchasing intents, which involves interpreting user text to select internal routing rules and configuration parameters.
- Ingestion points: User requests involving product names and action verbs (e.g., "开通", "购买") defined in
SKILL.mdandreferences/product-rule.md. - Boundary markers: A mandatory user confirmation step serves as a boundary between the interpretation of the request and the execution of tool commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute
Bashcommands includingve,git, anduuidgen. - Sanitization: Command parameters are primarily derived from static local configuration files (e.g.,
references/tos.md) rather than being directly interpolated from untrusted user strings.
Audit Metadata