phaser4-frame-animation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's scripts, specifically video-to-atlas.mjs and frame-atlas-core.mjs, execute external binaries (ffmpeg and ffprobe) using node:child_process.spawn. While this implementation avoids shell interpolation, the paths for these executables are configurable via CLI arguments (e.g., --ffmpeg, --ffprobe), which represents a minor attack surface if an agent is influenced to use unintended binaries.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided media files (videos, images) and their metadata, which are subsequently used by a sub-agent (gpt-6.1-sol) to generate animation prompts. This workflow creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection if asset metadata or filenames contain malicious instructions meant to influence the sub-agent's output.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The utility script frame-atlas-core.mjs generates an HTML preview file containing a client-side JavaScript player using a template. Additionally, the test suite video-to-atlas.test.mjs uses node:vm's runInNewContext to execute scripts in a sandboxed environment for testing purposes. These are localized to specific utility and testing functions and do not facilitate arbitrary code execution during primary runtime operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 12:42 PM