phaser4-frame-animation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's scripts, specifically
video-to-atlas.mjsandframe-atlas-core.mjs, execute external binaries (ffmpegandffprobe) usingnode:child_process.spawn. While this implementation avoids shell interpolation, the paths for these executables are configurable via CLI arguments (e.g.,--ffmpeg,--ffprobe), which represents a minor attack surface if an agent is influenced to use unintended binaries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided media files (videos, images) and their metadata, which are subsequently used by a sub-agent (
gpt-6.1-sol) to generate animation prompts. This workflow creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection if asset metadata or filenames contain malicious instructions meant to influence the sub-agent's output. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The utility script
frame-atlas-core.mjsgenerates an HTML preview file containing a client-side JavaScript player using a template. Additionally, the test suitevideo-to-atlas.test.mjsusesnode:vm'srunInNewContextto execute scripts in a sandboxed environment for testing purposes. These are localized to specific utility and testing functions and do not facilitate arbitrary code execution during primary runtime operations.
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