wix-headless-fast

No clear malicious code indicators (no eval/Function/dynamic execution, no suspicious domains beyond the hardcoded Wix API base, no local persistence). The module is a highly privileged automation tool: it executes `npx @wix/cli@latest` at runtime to obtain a bearer token and then performs authenticated, potentially destructive Wix API operations (installing apps, bulk creating/updating menus and images, and deleting sample menu entities; enabling ordering/reservations). Primary risk is supply-chain/version variability from using `@wix/cli@latest` plus operational impact from using bearer-token authenticated state-changing APIs; suppressed errors reduce auditability but do not themselves prove malice.

SUSPICIOUS: the skill’s purpose and capabilities are mostly aligned for Wix onboarding, and data flows stay with Wix/offical tooling, but it asks the agent to download-execute an unpinned remote script and to install additional skills transitively. This looks more like medium supply-chain and trust-expansion risk than credential theft or confirmed malware.