openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and executes instructions provided by project-level configuration files via the
openspec instructionscommand. It explicitly treats theinstructionfield as 'authoritative guidance', creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the project environment or configuration is compromised. - Ingestion points: Data returned by
openspec instructions <artifact-id> --change "<name>" --json(Step 5a). - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present; the skill is explicitly told to follow these instructions as the primary source of truth.
- Capability inventory: File writing at resolved paths and shell command execution using the
Bash(openspec:*)tool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested
instructioncontent is performed before the agent acts upon it.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using user-supplied inputs and external project data. While theallowed-toolsconfiguration restricts execution to theopenspecbinary, the skill includes a specific workflow to delegate creation to commands found within the (potentially untrusted)instructionmetadata field. - Evidence: The instructions state: 'If the
instructionfield delegates creation to a specific skill or command, invoke it to produce the artifact instead of writing the file yourself'.
Audit Metadata