skills/yahyabedirhan/skills/handover/Gen Agent Trust Hub

handover

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include techniques to bypass security filters. Specifically, Step 5 advises the agent to split git commands into individual calls to evade 'deny rules' that might block a single call containing multiple commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute various shell commands, including git for worktree management, committing, and pushing changes. It also executes user-defined environment tools like <worktree-tool>, <session-host>, and <agent> to manage and spawn new processes.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The flow involves committing and pushing local repository state to a remote server via git push. While part of a legitimate developer workflow, this represents a network operation that transmits local data to an external location.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a handover mechanism where the current session writes instructions into a 'handoff' file which is then used to prompt a subsequent agent session. This creates a vulnerability surface where potentially malicious data from the current session can influence the next session's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The 'handoff' file generated in Step 3 of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the handoff file as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Git file operations (write, commit, push), process execution via <agent> (Step 7).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps to sanitize, escape, or validate the content written to the handoff file before it is processed by the next agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 04:16 PM