handover
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include techniques to bypass security filters. Specifically, Step 5 advises the agent to split git commands into individual calls to evade 'deny rules' that might block a single call containing multiple commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute various shell commands, including
gitfor worktree management, committing, and pushing changes. It also executes user-defined environment tools like<worktree-tool>,<session-host>, and<agent>to manage and spawn new processes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The flow involves committing and pushing local repository state to a remote server via
git push. While part of a legitimate developer workflow, this represents a network operation that transmits local data to an external location. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a handover mechanism where the current session writes instructions into a 'handoff' file which is then used to prompt a subsequent agent session. This creates a vulnerability surface where potentially malicious data from the current session can influence the next session's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The 'handoff' file generated in Step 3 of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the handoff file as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: Git file operations (write, commit, push), process execution via
<agent>(Step 7). - Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps to sanitize, escape, or validate the content written to the handoff file before it is processed by the next agent.
Audit Metadata