wispr-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/wispr.pyutility usessubprocess.runto execute the system commandpgrepto check if the Wispr Flow application is running. The command uses hardcoded arguments and does not incorporate user-provided input, preventing command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes transcription data (speech-to-text results) which are untrusted external inputs. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the transcripts contain instructions intended to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Text data is read from the
Historytable inscripts/wispr.pyduring history retrieval and counting operations. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions mandate that the agent must report its findings and obtain user approval before executing any modifications to the database.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of reading from and writing to a local SQLite database and writing local JSON backup files.
- Sanitization: All database interactions in the provided Python script use parameterized SQL queries, ensuring that transcribed text cannot be used to manipulate database command structures.
Audit Metadata