skills/yamadashy/skills/pr-deps-merge/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pr-deps-merge

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from dependency pull requests (titles, bodies, and changelogs), which presents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: PR metadata and body content are retrieved in SKILL.md using gh pr list and gh pr view.
  • Boundary markers: Step 0 of SKILL.md contains explicit instructions to treat all PR content as data and never as instructions, specifically warning about compromised dependencies placing payloads in changelogs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to approve and merge pull requests using gh pr review and gh pr merge.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on safety gates that extract specific metadata (e.g., version components and commit verification) rather than executing instructions found within the PR text.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to an external registry to verify dependency information.
  • Evidence: Fetches crate metadata from the official crates.io API in SKILL.md to check the release date of dependencies as part of a security cooldown gate.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a localized script to process data retrieved from an external service.
  • Evidence: Employs a hardcoded Python one-liner (python3 -c) in SKILL.md to parse JSON output from the crates.io API to extract a timestamp.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/ - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 02:44 AM