pr-deps-merge
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from dependency pull requests (titles, bodies, and changelogs), which presents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PR metadata and body content are retrieved in
SKILL.mdusinggh pr listandgh pr view. - Boundary markers: Step 0 of
SKILL.mdcontains explicit instructions to treat all PR content as data and never as instructions, specifically warning about compromised dependencies placing payloads in changelogs. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to approve and merge pull requests using
gh pr reviewandgh pr merge. - Sanitization: The skill relies on safety gates that extract specific metadata (e.g., version components and commit verification) rather than executing instructions found within the PR text.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to an external registry to verify dependency information.
- Evidence: Fetches crate metadata from the official
crates.ioAPI inSKILL.mdto check the release date of dependencies as part of a security cooldown gate. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a localized script to process data retrieved from an external service.
- Evidence: Employs a hardcoded Python one-liner (
python3 -c) inSKILL.mdto parse JSON output from thecrates.ioAPI to extract a timestamp.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/ - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata