frida-mcp-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources which creates a potential surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from external Frida documentation searches (
search_frida_docs) and interprets output from instrumentation sessions as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands potentially embedded within documentation or tool output.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files and execute JavaScript code within target processes using the
load_scripttool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization applied to the documentation results or process output before they are processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill follows a pattern of script generation and subsequent execution.
- In
Phase 2: ScriptingandPhase 3: ExecutionofSKILL.md, the agent is instructed to write JavaScript instrumentation scripts (based ontemplates/script-template.js) and execute them using aload_scripttool. - This dynamic behavior is the primary purpose of the skill; it includes safety mitigations such as mandatory
script_iddeclarations, idempotence guards to prevent duplicate hooks, and defined teardown paths (uninstallRPC export).
Audit Metadata