zk-model-pass
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires and provides internal scripts to manage its 3D optimization and verification workflow.
- Evidence:
scripts/shot-server.pyis a Python-based HTTP server launched by the agent to receive screenshot data from the browser and save it to the disk. - Evidence:
scripts/compare.shis a shell script that invokes ImageMagick tools to generate visual comparison montages and pixel-level diffs. - Context: These tools are intended for use in a local development environment (the 'studio' page).
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted project-level data that guides the agent's remodeling decisions, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads instructions from a project's
3D-STYLE.mdfile (Step 0 inSKILL.md) and project configuration data inpackage.json(Step 1 inreferences/setup.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific warnings provided to the agent to treat content within these project files as non-authoritative data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to execute shell scripts, write files, and perform browser-based execution (
javascript_tool), which could be leveraged if the3D-STYLE.mdcontains malicious instructions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content of the project's style guide or configuration files before processing.
Audit Metadata