filebrowser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runwithinscripts/filebrowser_transfer/object_storage.pyto execute a companion skill (object-storage). The path to the scripts for the companion skill is determined at runtime by searching through environment variables (OBJECT_STORAGE_SKILL_DIR), current and parent directories, and user home directories. This mechanism permits the execution of external code from locations resolved dynamically based on the environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/filebrowser_transfer/object_storage.py, theCliObjectStorageGatewayclass constructs and executes shell commands usinguv run. This pattern involves the runtime discovery and execution of external projects, which can lead to the execution of unintended code if the environment is misconfigured or compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves file names, metadata, and file content (when the
--contentflag is used) from remote FileBrowser instances and presents this information to the agent. Maliciously crafted data on the remote storage could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
info,list_files, andsearchmethods inscripts/filebrowser_transfer/filebrowser.pyfetch data from the remote API. - Boundary markers: The skill outputs results in JSON format, but does not use specific delimiters or warnings to isolate this untrusted content within the agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network access (via
httpx), file system writing (staging for transfers), and shell command execution (viasubprocess.run). - Sanitization: While the skill implements path normalization to prevent directory traversal, it does not sanitize the contents of file metadata or bodies for embedded instructions before they are interpolated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata