canghe-image-gen

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external files (via --promptfiles and --ref) and standard input to construct instructions for AI models without implementing safety boundaries.
  • Ingestion points: Prompt text files, reference image files, and stdin are processed in scripts/main.ts.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are used when interpolating external content into the model requests.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local files, create directories, write files, and perform network requests to multiple API endpoints.
  • Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on the content of the ingested files before they are transmitted to external providers.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill facilitates authentication by loading sensitive API keys from environment variables and local configuration files (.canghe-skills/.env). Accessing plain-text secret files is a common but sensitive operational pattern.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local files (specifically reference images) and transmits their contents to external services (OpenAI, Google, Alibaba, and Canghe). Although this is the intended behavior for image-to-image tasks, it creates a mechanism for transmitting local file data to remote servers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system operations, including recursive directory creation and file writing, based on paths provided via command-line arguments. This could lead to unauthorized file modification if the agent is directed to use sensitive system paths for output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 02:45 AM